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Peer Effects and Social Preferences in Voluntary Cooperation
*
 
Substantial evidence suggests the behavioral relevance of social preferences and also the 
importance of social influence effects (“peer effects”). Yet, little is known about how peer 
effects and social preferences are related. In a three-person gift-exchange experiment we 
find causal evidence for peer effects in voluntary cooperation: agents’ efforts are positively 
related despite the absence of material payoff interdependencies. We confront this result with 
major theories of social preferences which predict that efforts are unrelated, or negatively 
related. Some theories allow for positively-related efforts but cannot explain most 
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this paper. I. Introduction 
Is pro-social voluntary cooperation subject to ‘peer effects’ that is, influenced by the 
behavior of comparison others? Or is pro-sociality best thought of as being a characteristic of 
people’s preferences that is largely immune to social influence? These questions are 
motivated by different – and hitherto largely unrelated – strands of literature. The literature on 
social preferences shows that many people are often willing to act against their self-interest 
even in anonymous one-shot situations with material incentives to behave selfishly and no 
possibilities for social influence (e.g., Fehr and Fischbacher (2002); Camerer (2003); Gintis et 
al. (2005)). The literatures on social influence effects (also called ‘peer effects’) show that 
people’s behavior in many economically important domains is often strongly shaped by what 
comparison others do.
1 Similarly, social psychologists have long argued that situational cues 
(provided by the environment or the behavior of others) are often more important than 
personality traits (Asch (1952); Ross and Nisbett (1991)). Both social preferences and peer 
effects are firmly established empirically, but little is known about how social preferences, 
which carefully control for material incentives, are influenced by peer effects.
2  
The main contribution of this paper is to clarify this relationship empirically and 
theoretically by (i) providing a novel experimental design that allows to causally demonstrate 
peer effects in preferences in an environment that tightly controls for strategic incentives (ii) 
by analyzing what all major theories of social preferences (introduced below) predict about 
peer effects in social preferences and by (iii) providing an experimental test of the best-reply 
predictions of these theories. For our analysis we are mainly interested in the well-
documented social preference of reciprocity in a game of voluntary cooperation.  
Understanding the link between social preferences and peer effects is important for two 
reasons. First, in reality social preferences are often relevant in environments that are 
potentially rich in possibilities for social influence effects (think of the workplace as a prime 
example). Second, suppose we find evidence that voluntary cooperation is subject to peer 
effects. What would the implication be for theories of social preferences that aim at 
explaining voluntary cooperation? To appreciate this question, consider that the evidence on 
social preferences has directed theoretical research at understanding individuals’ behavior as a 
feature of people’s given preferences. For example, in popular theories of inequity aversion 
(Bolton and Ockenfels (2000);  Fehr and Schmidt (1999)) people’s social preferences are 
modeled as individually fixed distastes for inequitable outcomes. Evidence for peer effects 
would constitute a prima facie challenge to fixed preference assumptions. 
Our tool to measure peer effects is a one-shot three-person gift-exchange game where a 
principal pays his or her two agents i and j a wage w (the same for both) and the agents 
                                                 
1 Some examples from field evidence comprise deviant behavior (Sampson, Morenoff and Gannon-Rowley 
(2002)), academic success (e.g., Sacerdote (2001)), savings behavior (e.g., Duflo and Saez (2002)); conditional 
cooperation (Frey and Meier (2004); Chen et al. (2010)); charitable donations (Croson and Shang (2008); Shang 
and Croson (2009)); health-related issues like alcohol consumption (Kremer and Levy (2008)) and obesity 
(Christakis and Fowler (2007)) and behavior in the workplace (Ichino and Maggi (2000); Mas and Moretti 
(2009); Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2010)).  
2 There is only a small literature on peer effects in social preferences conducted in a way that carefully controls 
for self-regarding motives. We discuss our contribution to this literature below. 
  1choose efforts ei and ej. The material incentive structure gives both agents an incentive to 
choose minimal effort (‘to shirk’) irrespective of w and irrespective of the other agent’s effort. 
However, from numerous two-person gift-exchange games we expect that many agents will 
choose efforts that increase in the wage (see Fehr and Gächter (2000); Fehr, Goette and 
Zehnder (2009); Charness and Kuhn (2011) for surveys). Since the experiment is anonymous, 
one-shot, and all players know this, effort choice is an expression of people’s social 
preference. In this situation we will speak of a ‘peer effect’ if ei = f(ej)|w, that is, holding the 
common wage w constant, agent i’s effort depends on agent j’s effort (f’ ≠ 0), despite the 
absence of any earnings interdependency between agents.  
A major problem of measuring peer effects empirically is the “reflection problem” 
(Manski (1993), Manski (2000)) which results from the mutual social influences people might 
have on each other: ei = f(ej)|w and ej = f(ei)|w. If i is influenced by j and j is influenced by i it is 
impossible to disentangle the causal influences i and j have on each other. Here we propose a 
design that avoids the reflection problem. The main idea is to make the effort of the other 
agent exogenous. To achieve this, both agents first choose their efforts simultaneously and 
then, after having learned the effort decision of their co-agent, are given the opportunity to 
revise their effort, holding their co-agent’s effort constant. Since the design removes any 
material and strategic incentives to revise effort, revision decisions (compared to a control 
condition with no effort information) tell us about the extent to which people change their 
effort because of the effort chosen by the co-agent. To our knowledge, this is a novel design 
to measure peer effects in voluntary cooperation. 
Effort revisions are significantly more likely and substantially bigger when agents are 
informed about their co-agent’s decision (in our main treatment) than when they are 
uniformed (control treatment). When agents learn that their co-agent has provided lower effort 
than them they revise their efforts downwards, but they hardly increase their effort when their 
co-agent provided higher effort. Agents’ efforts are positively correlated but with a kink at the 
co-agent’s effort.  
Is this peer effect evidence for the non-stability of social preferences? At first glance our 
results suggest this interpretation. Many agents choose non-minimal initial efforts suggesting 
other-regarding preferences but are then willing to revise their effort in light of effort 
information that is inconsequential for their own material payoff.  
To understand whether peer effects in social preferences are a novel phenomenon that is 
incompatible with existing theories of social preferences we analyze the theoretical 
predictions of widely used theories of social preferences. These theories model various 
distributional and/or intentional concerns. Given our research question we focus on the best-
reply predictions with regard to effort changes, that is, dei/dej. To our knowledge, no such 
analysis has been done in the context of explaining peer effects in voluntary cooperation.  
There are three main reasons for consulting theories of social preferences. First, theories 
of social preferences aim at explaining behavior also in novel games like ours, not just 
existing ones. Second, among many other games, these theories can account for non-minimal 
efforts in the bilateral version of the gift-exchange game. It is thus obvious to explore the 
explanatory power of these theories in the trilateral gift-exchange game. Third, we not only 
  2explore the implications of one particular theory but compare predictions for all major 
theories of social preferences with the ambition to explain behavior in many games. The 
reason for this comprehensive approach is to see whether these theories, which include 
diverse psychological motivations, come up with robust (that is, concurrent) predictions about 
how agent j’s effort influences agent i’s effort (that is, the sign of dei/dej). Even if these 
theories do not come up with concurrent predictions the question is which theories predict the 
peer effects we observe.  
We consider (1) models of  distributional preferences in the form of altruism (Cox, 
Friedman and Gjerstad (2007), Charness and Rabin (2002)
3) and inequity aversion ((Bolton 
and Ockenfels (2000); Fehr and Schmidt (1999)) or a combination of both (Kohler (2011)); 
(2)  models of reciprocity ( Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004);  Levine (1998)); and (3) 
hybrid models that combine interpersonal comparisons and reciprocity (Charness and Rabin 
(2002); Falk and Fischbacher (2006); Cox, et al. (2007)). Hence, our analysis does not favor 
one theory a priori. 
Our analysis (reported in Section IV) shows that the most robust predictions of these 
standard theories of social preferences are that either there are no peer effects (efforts are 
unrelated in models of reciprocity), or if there are peer effects, efforts are negatively related 
(in all other models). Three models predict that, in addition to being negatively related, efforts 
can also be positively related: Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Charness and Rabin (2002) and 
Kohler (2011). Our experimental finding of peer effects with positively correlated efforts 
seems therefore inconsistent with most models. However, this evidence is not fully conclusive 
because the theoretical analysis makes predictions about the agents’ best-reply functions, 
which our simple revision decisions do not reveal.  
To have a more conclusive test we therefore ran experiments where we also elicited the 
agents’ beliefs about the initial effort choice of their co-agent. Thus, we now observe two 
points on each agent’s best-response which allows us to draw conclusions about the slope of 
the best-reply functions. The results, reported in Section V, unambiguously reject the 
prediction of most theories that efforts will be negatively related. In the peer effect we 
observe, efforts are strategic complements, not substitutes. Also the theories that predict 
positively correlated efforts are only exactly consistent with a minority of choices.  
While standard theories of social preferences typically predict the opposite of what we 
observe, some recent theories of social preferences, which model motives like conformism 
(Sliwka (2007)), norm-following (López-Pérez (2008)), or social esteem (Ellingsen and 
Johannesson (2008)) can explain the peer effects we observe. In our concluding section VI we 
shortly discuss these theories and provide remarks about future research.  
In summary and comparison to the literature, this paper makes two main and intertwined 
contributions. Our first contribution is to provide novel and causal evidence for peer effects in 
reciprocity by using the gift-exchange game run in the direct response method and by ruling 
out confounding factors such as strategic incentives that might be present, for instance, in 
                                                 
3 We classify the basic model by Charness and Rabin (2002) as a model of altruism because – in contrast to 
models of inequity aversion – the derivatives of utility with respect to other player’s earnings are always non-
negative (this does, however, not hold for the reciprocity extension discussed in their appendix). 
  3repeated interactions (as in Falk, Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) who used finitely repeated 
simultaneous public goods games to study peer effects in voluntary cooperation). The use of 
the direct response method is one distinguishing feature of this paper relative to Gächter, 
Nosenzo and Sefton (2012) and Gächter, Nosenzo and Sefton (forthcoming) who also use a 
three-person gift-exchange game but play it in the strategy method.
4 Both studies find 
evidence for peer effects which take the form of positively correlated efforts, but by their 
strategy-method designs are unable to observe the kink in efforts we are able to observe in our 
design. Moreover, both papers also allow for wage inequality, which our design precludes for 
keeping the present research question simple. One focus of these papers is to study the role of 
wage inequality for peer effects, an issue which we do not consider.  
Our focus on reciprocity in voluntary cooperation by using the gift-exchange game 
separates our study from papers that investigate peer effects (in the absence of any payoff 
spillovers like in our case) in non-reciprocal sharing in the dictator game (Cason and Mui 
(1998);  Bicchieri and Xiao (2009) and Krupka and Weber (2009)). Papers more closely 
related to the experimental part of our paper are Bardsley and Sausgruber (2005) and Mittone 
and Ploner (2011). Bardsley and Sausgruber provide evidence that contributions to a one-shot 
public good can be shaped by observing the contributions of an unrelated other group.   
Mittone and Ploner also study a sequential game of reciprocity, in their case the trust game, 
and unlike us, they use the strategy method. Their central tool is an observer/observed design 
with the difference to our study that the relevant group of recipients is comprised of groups of 
four, two of which are observed and two are the observers. The results are that the observed 
tend to be more trustworthy than recipients in a baseline condition and the return rates 
('trustworthiness') of the observed and observer recipients are positively correlated, which is 
evidence for peer effects in reciprocity. As will become clear below, in our design, everyone 
is an observer and an observed and strategic incentives to influence others is removed.  
Our second contribution that separates us from all aforementioned experimental studies is 
to clarify the power of a range of theories of social preferences for explaining peer effects in 
reciprocity. We provide a formal analysis and then run further specially-designed experiments 
to compare the theoretical best-reply predictions (slopes) with the empirically estimated slope. 
To our knowledge no such analysis has yet been done in the context of peer effects. Such an 
analysis is important, however, to safeguard against premature declarations of peer effects as 
a phenomenon that requires separate explanations from those of existing theories.  
Most papers which look at predictions of theories of social preferences use one model 
only (most typically, the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model). As explained above, we deem it 
important, however, not to pre-select one particular theory but to look at a whole range of 
theories, which capture different psychological motivations, to understand why and when 
these theories can, or cannot, explain peer effects. Such an analysis can narrow the range of 
theories that are candidate explanations for peer effects, even if we acknowledge that one 
lesson of tests of theories of social preferences is that all fail in some dimensions (e.g., 
                                                 
4 Gächter and Thöni (2010) also study a three-person gift-exchange experiment but their focus is on wage 
inequality; they do not study peer effects.  
  4Charness and Rabin (2002); Engelmann and Strobel (2004); Cox, et al. (2007); Falk, Fehr and 
Fischbacher (2008); Daruvala (2010)) and maybe especially so in three-person games (e.g., 
Kagel and Wolfe (2001)). A comprehensive comparative analysis can provide insights about 
patterns of failures across classes of theories that is informative in its own right.  
 
II. Design and Procedures 
A. The Three-Person Gift-Exchange Game with a Revision Stage 
Our three-person gift-exchange game is a simple extension of the two-player gift-
exchange game (Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993)) – there is one principal and two 
identical agents. The principal first chooses the same wage  { } 50,100,200 w∈  for both agents. 
After observing this wage the two agents decide simultaneously about their effort, that is, they 
choose  { } 1,2,...,20 i e ∈
j e
. In some of the sessions we elicit the agents’ beliefs about their co-
agent’s effort choice  ′ (we will provide our rationale for eliciting beliefs in Section V). 
Agents then learn about the revision stage where they are informed about the ‘initial 
effort’ decision of their co-agent, ej.
5 In light of this new information agents are told that they 
can, but do not have to, revise their effort. Both agents simultaneously choose a revised effort 
{ } ˆ 1,2,...,20 i e ∈ . However, to make the revision decision incentive compatible, agents are told 
that only for one randomly selected agent the revised effort will be relevant for calculating 
earnings, while for the other agent the initial effort will be payoff relevant. The agent whose 
revised effort will be payoff relevant will be decided at random. A random device generates 
r ∈ {0,1} with equal probability. In case r = 1 agent 1’s revised effort and agent 2’s initial 
effort are payoff relevant (that is, agent 2’s revised effort has no effect on any of the 
earnings). In case of r = 0, agent 2’s revised effort and agent 1’s initial effort are payoff 
relevant (and agent 1’s revised effort has no effect on any of the earnings). Subjects know this 
procedure (but not yet the outcome) when choosing the revised effort. The expected earnings 
of the principal are 
  [ ] 12 12 ˆ () ( 1 ) () 2 =+ + − + − P ˆ x vre e r e e w , (1) 
where v > 0 is the constant marginal product of the agents’ efforts. The earnings of the two 
agents are calculated as 
  11 1 2 2 ˆˆ ( ) (1 ) ( ) and (1 ) ( ) ( ) =− −− =−− − 2 x w r ce rce x w rce r ce , (2) 
                                                 
5 When agents decided on their initial effort they did not yet know about the possibility to revise effort. This is 
necessary to avoid that the initial effort is strategically biased, which would preclude a clean measurement of 
peer effects. The information about the revision possibility and its description appeared on a separate screen (for 
the exact wordings see Appendix A). The reader may ask why this procedure rather than letting the agents 
choose their efforts sequentially. We could then test whether the effort decision of the second mover depends on 
the effort decision of the first moving agent. However, it is difficult to disentangle peer effects from the second-
moving agent’s disposition to reciprocate towards the principal. The first mover might have set his or her effort 
strategically, to influence the second mover’s effort. Our design avoids these problems. 
  5where the cost of effort is equal to c(ei) = 7(ei – 1) for both agents.
6 Note that we do not allow 
the principal to differentiate the wages between the two agents because we want to observe 
the two agents in an identical situation. Allowing for different wages would have given agents 
motives for choosing different initial effort levels. For the same reason the two agents have an 
identical marginal productivity (v).  
The revised effort is our main instrument to identify social interaction effects. The only 
change between the initial effort decision and the revision stage is the additional information 
about the co-agent’s effort. We will use Δei = êi – ei as a measure for the reaction to effort 
information, that is, as an indication for a pure peer effect.  
It is important to note that we measure peer effects in a situation where the co-agent’s 
effort remains unchanged. This design feature avoids the reflection problem. When choosing 
the revised effort, agent i knows that either his decision has no effect (r = 0) or the effort of 
the co-agent remains unchanged (r = 1). The random selection of either the initial effort or the 
revised effort ensures that the co-agent’s effort is exogenous and has the added advantage that 
it allows us to collect revision decisions from all agents.
7  
A caveat is in order, however. We cannot rule out the possibility that subjects might want 
to change their effort decision in the revision stage for reasons unrelated to peer effects. For 
instance, one might be concerned that the mere existence of the revision stage induces an 
‘experimenter demand effect’ (e.g., Orne (1962);  Zizzo (2010)). If subjects are asked to 
decide again about their effort they might feel urged to change their decision. A second reason 
might be ‘virtual learning’ (Weber (2003)): the revision stage provides subjects with an 
additional opportunity to think through the problem. Third, effort revisions might simply 
occur due to change of mind or errors. Thus, in order to isolate peer effects from other sources 
of effort revisions we need a control treatment in addition to the ‘Effort Information 
treatment’ (EIT). Our control treatment, called the ‘No Information treatment’ (NIT), is 
identical to the game explained above except when reaching the revision stage subjects are 
not informed about the effort choice of the co-agent. 
B. Further Design Features and Procedural Details 
To check for the robustness of our results we changed several contextual parameters 
across sessions. First, we varied the level of the agents’ productivity (v = 18 or v = 35 for both 
agents) and therefore the gains from cooperation. Second, to be able to test theoretical 
predictions (Section V) we elicited beliefs about the co-agent’s initial effort choice. However, 
eliciting beliefs might influence effort choices (Croson (2000); Gächter and Renner (2010)). 
For this reason we include the belief elicitation only in some of the sessions. 
Part of our subjects played a one-shot, three-person gift-exchange game prior to the 
experiment we report in this paper. In this ‘Experiment 1’ (reported in Gächter and Thöni 
                                                 
6 To rule out overall losses all players were endowed with 400 ECU. 
7 Another possibility would have been to randomly select one agent and ask him or her whether he or she would 
like to revise the effort. The disadvantage of this procedure is that it would only generate data from half of the 
agents. Our method generates revision decisions from all agents but still preserves the feature that the other 
agent’s effort is exogenous if the chosen agent’s revised effort becomes relevant for calculating earnings. 
  6(2010)) agents made their effort decision in the strategy method. We will use the data from 
Experiment 1 to classify our subjects into selfish and non-selfish types. This provides us with 
a measure for other-regarding preferences that is not derived from the decisions in the 
experiments reported here. Subjects in Experiment 1 did not receive any information about 
other subjects’ decisions prior to the experiment presented in this paper.  
Another group of subjects played eight rounds of a three-person gift-exchange game with 
random matching (in matching groups of 12 subjects). These subjects had more experience 
with the game prior to the start of the experiment at hand. During the eight rounds agents 
received information about their principal's wage offerings but agents did not receive any 
direct information about their co-agent's effort choices. We will label these subjects as 
Experienced and use this contextual variation to check whether increased experience with the 
game influences peer effects. See Gächter and Thöni (2010) for the results of Experiment 1 
and the Experienced sessions.  
We conducted the experiment at the Universities of St. Gallen and Zurich in computerized 
laboratories where subjects were separated by partitions and thus took their decisions in 
isolation and without communication. All decisions were anonymous. We used the software 
z-Tree (Fischbacher (2007)) to run our experiments and ORSEE (Greiner (2004)) for 
recruiting the subjects. Like in previous gift-exchange experiments (e.g., Fehr, Gächter and 
Kirchsteiger (1997)), we framed the experiment in a ‘buyer-seller’ terminology. We chose 
this frame because we deem it to be more neutral than a labor relations frame.
8 
Our research question requires a one-shot experiment. We therefore took great care to 
ensure that subjects understand the rules, as well as the pecuniary payoff consequences of 
their decisions. Subjects had to answer a set of control questions on payoff consequences. To 
help subjects calculate earnings, the software provided a ‘What-if calculator’, where subjects 
could calculate the monetary payoff consequences for all players and all possible 
combinations of efforts and wages. The ‘What-if Calculator’ was available at all stages of the 
experiment. Figure 1 illustrates an example of a decision screen subjects saw at the revision 
stage after having been informed about the revision stage.  
Table B1 (Appendix B) provides an overview of the number of observations by treatment 
and contextual variation. We have observations from 18 sessions with a total of 489 
participants, 326 agents and 163 principals. The majority (330) decided in the EIT. The 
remaining 159 subjects decided in the NIT. We imposed no time limit for decisions. The 
experiment lasted about 30 minutes and the average earnings were CHF 13.8 (€ 8.8). 
 
                                                 
8 It is of course an empirical question whether framing matters in our context. Answering this question is beyond 
the scope of this paper. The existing evidence from a related game (the bribery game, which contains an element 
of reciprocity, see Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt (2006)) suggests that framing does not matter. 
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FIGURE 1: EXAMPLE SCREEN SHOT OF THE DECISION SCREEN AT THE REVISION STAGE  
IN THE EFFORT INFORMATION TREATMENT. 
 
III. Results I: Existence and Direction of Peer Effects 
A. Initial Effort Choices 
Recall that the EIT and the NIT are identical up to the revision stage. For analyzing initial 
effort choices we therefore pool the data. As expected from numerous gift-exchange 
experiments (surveyed in Fehr and Gächter (2000); Fehr, et al. (2009); Charness and Kuhn 
(2011)), efforts increase in wages.
9  
Table 1 shows the results of a regression analysis explaining initial efforts. For this 
analysis we will make use of Experiment 1 conducted in the strategy method prior to the 
present experiment (without feedback, see Section II.B). We classify our subjects according 
to their behavior in Experiment 1 into ‘Selfish’ and ‘Non-selfish’. The latter are subjects who 
at least once chose a non-minimal effort in Experiment 1. We will later use this classification 
to look at the subgroup of subjects who were sufficiently reciprocal towards the principal to 
choose non-minimal efforts.
10 Here we check whether agents classified as selfish in 
Experiment 1 (28.1 percent of subjects) make different initial effort decisions than agents 
classified as non-selfish (71.9 percent). 
We look at initial efforts in two ways: first, the likelihood of choosing a non-minimal 
effort and, second, initial effort levels. We apply a Probit model for the decision to choose a 
non-minimal initial effort and a Tobit model to investigate initial effort levels (we chose Tobit 
because effort is censored at 1 and 20). The independent variables are dummies for the high 
                                                 
9 The average effort chosen at the lowest wage is 1.53; the intermediate wage triggered an average effort of 2.97 
and the highest wage an average effort of 5.53. Minimal efforts occurred in 68.4 percent, 49.0 percent and 37.5 
percent of the cases in which principals paid the low, intermediate and high wage, respectively. Among the 163 
principals in our sample 46.6 percent paid the lowest possible wage of 50. Another 31.3 percent paid the 
intermediate wage of 100 and the remaining 22.1 percent offered the highest wage of 200. 
10 In one session we did not run experiment 1. For these cases the variable Non-selfish in Exp1 is missing and the 
observations are dropped in all estimates which use this variable as a control or sample selection criterion. 
  8and low wage level; dummies that identify the contextual variations; and a dummy for 
experiments with belief elicitation. The baseline case is the intermediate wage and the 
observations stemming from the low productivity experiments in St. Gallen. The observations 
from the Experienced sessions are clustered on matching groups.  
 
TABLE 1: PROBIT AND TOBIT ESTIMATES FOR THE INITIAL EFFORT DECISION. 
   Probit: Non-minimal initial effort    Tobit: Initial effort 
   Coef SE  ME Coef  SE 
Non-selfish in Exp1 (D)  1.442***  0.216 0.47 5.793***  0.947 
Low wage (D)  -0.555***  0.190 -0.21 -3.002***  0.700 
High wage (D)  0.379*  0.229 0.15 3.340***  0.796 
Experienced (D)  -0.195  0.229 -0.08 -0.900  0.736 
Belief (D)  -0.307  0.230 -0.12 -1.327  0.810 
High productivity (D)  0.512*  0.310 0.19 1.429  1.300 
Zurich (D)  0.065  0.278 0.03 -0.081  1.087 
Constant -1.367***  0.296   -3.565***  1.111 
σ       4.138   
N 310      310   
Log likelihood  -167.6      -479.4   
p < χ2 , F  0.000      0.000   
Notes. All independent variables are dummies (D). We report coefficients and standard errors 
(SE) and, for the probit model, marginal effects (ME). We apply a robust estimation of the 
standard errors. Data from the Experienced treatments are clustered within matching group.  
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
In both models subjects classified as non-selfish in Experiment 1 are significantly more 
likely to choose a non-minimal initial effort; they also choose higher initial effort levels than 
subjects classified as selfish. Effort levels increase significantly in wages; the productivity 
parameter v has a marginally significant effect on the probability to choose a non-minimal 
effort.
11 All other variables are not significant. 
B. Existence of Peer Effects in Voluntary Cooperation 
In EIT agents revise their effort in 73 out of 220 of the cases (33.2 percent). Effort 
revisions also occur in the NIT: 24 out of 106 agents (22.6 percent) revise their effort but are 
more likely in EIT than in NIT (χ
2-test: p = .051).  
Peer effects in our one-shot environment presumably matter most among agents who care 
about others’ well-being at all. Agents with no or weak other-regarding preferences might be 
less influenced by peer effects, compared to agents who showed a willingness to deliver non-
minimal effort levels in Experiment 1. In order to investigate effort revisions of these agents, 
we study a reduced sample where we only look at cases in which agents chose a non-minimal 
effort in Experiment 1. In the EIT, 62 out of 141 (44.0 percent) of these non-selfish agents 
                                                 
11 According to the theories of social preferences the influence of v on effort in ambiguous. For example in the 
Fehr-Schmidt model a high v lowers the requirements on the preference parameters for observing non-minimal 
efforts (i.e., leads to more non-minimal efforts in a heterogeneous population). For those who choose non-
minimal efforts, however, a higher v decreases optimal efforts, because it is now ‘cheaper’ to increase the 
principal’s income. For details see section IV and Appendix C. 
  9revise their effort while 21 out of 82 (25.6 percent) do so in the NIT (χ
2-test: p = .006). Even 
more frequent are effort revisions among the subjects who chose a non-minimal initial effort. 
Sixty-eight percent of agents in EIT revise their effort. In NIT the corresponding number is 45 
percent (χ
2-test: p = .008).  
Because observations within a triad are not independent, we treat a triad as an independent 
cluster of observation. Table 2 reports the results of Probit estimations (coefficients, standard 
errors, and marginal effects). The dependent variable is Revision, a dummy for the decision to 
revise the effort, which equals one if Δei ≠ 0 and zero otherwise. 
 
TABLE 2: PROBIT ESTIMATIONS FOR THE DECISION TO REVISE EFFORT. 
   Dependent variable: Revise (dummy for êi ≠ 0) 
  Model 1 (all agents)  Model 2 (non-selfish agents only)
   Coef SE  ME  Coef  SE  ME 
EIT (D)  0.522*** 0.193 0.142 0.658***  0.224  0.215
Initial effort  0.136*** 0.039 0.040 0.133***  0.043  0.046
Minimal initial effort (D)  -1.398*** 0.257 -0.418 -1.441***  0.314  -0.446
Experienced (D)  -0.297  0.211 -0.082 -0.194  0.256  -0.065
Belief (D)  0.242  0.216 0.071 0.080  0.257  0.028
High productivity (D)  0.236  0.374 0.064 0.007  0.441  0.003
Zurich (D)  0.048  0.329 0.014 0.227  0.369  0.076
Constant -1.041*** 0.362   -0.957**  0.436   
N 326      223     
Log-likelihood -124.786      -94.851     
p > χ
2  0.000    0.000     
Notes. The NIT is the omitted benchmark. Apart from Initial effort all independent variables are dummies 
(D). We report coefficients, standard errors (SE), and marginal effects (ME). Model 1 uses all agents, and 
Model 2 only agents classified as non-selfish according to their decision in Experiment 1. We apply a 
robust estimation of the SE clustered within a matching group. * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
Model 1 shows that the EIT increases the probability of an effort revision significantly. 
The marginal effect is a 14.2 percentage point increase of the probability in the EIT compared 
to the NIT. We introduce the initial effort by two variables in order to allow for changes in the 
behavior of agents with minimal and non-minimal effort. Initial effort is the effort chosen (ei) 
and Minimal initial effort is a dummy for ei = 1. Both variables are highly significant: higher 
initial efforts increase the probability of an effort revision, whereas having chosen a minimal 
initial effort decreases the likelihood to revise substantially (by 41.8 percentage points). None 
of the other design parameters has a significant impact on the probability to revise effort.
12 
In Model 2 we repeat the estimation for the restricted sample of agents classified as non-
selfish. The marginal effect of effort information on revision increases to 21.5 percent. None 
of the other contextual variables has a significant effect on the probability of effort revisions. 
The absolute magnitude of effort revisions is considerably larger in EIT (.97 on average) 
than in NIT (.37). Thus, the average absolute effort revision differs by a factor of 2.6 between 
treatments. This effect is not only driven by the fact that agents revise effort more frequently 
                                                 
12 The wage is not used as explanatory variable because it is highly correlated with the initial effort. Wage 
dummies added to the Models in Table 2 are insignificant. 
  10when information about their co-agent’s effort is provided. In the subsample of agents who 
actually do revise effort (Δei ≠ 0) the difference between the average absolute effort revisions 
increases to 1.31 effort units. If we repeat the estimates of Table 2 but apply a Tobit 
regression with the absolute effort revision as dependent variable we get very similar results. 
We summarize these findings as follows: 
Result 1: We find evidence for peer effects in voluntary cooperation: Information 
about the other agent’s effort causes significantly more and substantially larger 
effort revisions compared to the No Information treatment. 
C. Direction of Peer Effects 
We first investigate whether effort information has a systematic effect on revised efforts, 
that is, we estimate the   function. We apply a Tobit estimate for the revised 
effort, dependent on the observed other agent's effort and controlling for own effort. Table 3 
reports the results of these estimates (EIT only).  
ˆ (,) ij eg e e = i
 
TABLE 3: TOBIT ESTIMATIONS FOR REVISED EFFORT. 
   Dependent variable: Revised effort (êi) 
  Model 1 (all agents)  Model 2 (non-selfish agents only)
   Coef SE  Coef SE 
Co-agent's initial effort (ej) 0.292***  0.081 0.411*** 0.115 
Initial effort   0.489***  0.092  0.373***  0.109 
Minimal initial effort (D)  -4.542***  0.737  -3.634***  0.605 
Experienced (D)  0.146  0.882  1.020  0.809 
Belief (D)  -0.377  0.922  -0.838  0.847 
High productivity (D)  -1.230  1.379  -1.707  1.134 
Zurich (D)  1.323  1.149  1.065  0.930 
Constant 0.236  0.909  0.923  0.848 
σ 2.910    2.221   
N   220    141   
Log-likelihood -248.8    -180.3   
p > F  0.000    0.000   
Notes. Except for the Co-agent's initial effort and the Initial effort all independent variables are dummies (D). 
Data from EIT only. Model 1 uses all agents; Model 2 uses only agents classified as non-selfish according to 
their decision in Experiment 1. Robust standard errors clustered within a triad. * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01. 
Model 1 shows that the co-agent's effort significantly influences the revised effort. The 
effect is positive, that is, high co-agent's efforts ceteris paribus increase the agent's effort and 
vice versa. In Model 2 we restrict our sample to the non-selfish types. The estimate for the 
subgroup is qualitatively similar to the estimate with the whole sample, but the influence of 
co-agent's effort is even stronger.
13  
The strong and positive influence of the observed co-agent’s effort on the revised effort 
suggests that, on average, efforts are complements. In a next step we take a closer look at how 
                                                 
13 Tobit estimates including wage controls provide almost identical results as shown in Table 3 and the wage 
dummies are insignificant (wages are highly correlated with initial efforts). 
  11the observed difference between j’s effort and i’s effort influences i’s revision decision, that 
is, we look at the function  .  () ij i eh ee Δ= −
Figure 2 provides a scatter plot of the differences in initial efforts ei and ej and the effort 
revision in EIT (n = 220 observations). The size of dots is proportional to the number of 
underlying observations. Observations on the thin horizontal line stem from agents who left 
their effort unchanged. The second thin line is the 45-degree line. Observations on this line 
mean that an agent matched the co-agent’s effort exactly. The numbers in the scatter plot 
indicate the number of observations within a region. Numbers at the end of the thin lines 
count the observations on the line for negative or positive effort differences, respectively. 
Numbers in areas between lines count observations within the regions between the thin lines.  
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FIGURE 2: SCATTER PLOT OF EFFORT REVISIONS DEPENDENT ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE 
AGENTS’ INITIAL EFFORTS. The thin lines show the limit cases of no effort revisions (horizontal 
line) and ‘perfect’ effort revisions (45-degree line). The bold line depicts a trend line. The total 
number of observations is 220. Numbers next to lines indicate number of cases on the respective 
line, and numbers between line indicate number of cases between lines.  
For negative initial effort differentials (ej < ei), 20 effort revisions are on the diagonal, and 
19 are on the zero-revision line. Eighteen observations are between the zero-revision line and 
the diagonal. These agents revise their effort towards the other agent’s effort but do not match 
it. The number in the middle of the graph (79) indicates the number of observations with no 
initial effort difference and no effort revision. Ninety percent of these observations are from 
agents choosing minimal initial effort. In case of positive effort differentials (ej > ei) agents 
either match the other agent’s effort (in 8 cases), adjust towards the other agent’s effort but 
not fully (in 5 cases), or, in most cases (49), do not revise their effort. 
The observations in Figure 2 suggest asymmetric reactions to positive and negative effort 
differentials. When fitting the data with a regression line we therefore allow for different 
slopes and different intercepts. This trend line (the bold line in Figure 2) shows a quite 
substantial kink at ej – ei = 0, which suggests that on average people only react to their co-
  12agent’s effort if the co-agent chooses a lower effort than them. Higher effort levels by the co-
agent do not trigger upward revisions.  
Table 4 shows regressions of effort revision on the initial effort differential (ej – ei), the 
initial effort ei, and the contextual parameters. Model 1 disregards any kink in the revision 
response. The effort differential has a positive and highly significant impact on effort 
revisions. An increase of the effort differential by one unit induces an agent to increase his 
effort in the revision stage by .18 units, ceteris paribus.
14 
 
TABLE 4: EFFORT REVISIONS AS A FUNCTION OF EFFORT DIFFERENCES 
   Dependent variable: Δei 
  Model 1  Model 2    Model 3 
    Coef SE    Coef SE      Coef SE 
Initial effort difference  0.177*** 0.046 0.379*** 0.115   0.372***  0.118
Initial effort difference if > 0      -0.337**  0.134   -0.329**  0.138
Initial effort difference > 0 (D)      0.181  0.196   0.212  0.278
Experienced×Initial  effort  difference          0.184  0.294
Experienced×Initial effort diff. if > 0            -0.340  0.277
Experienced×Initial effort diff. > 0 (D)            0.036  0.342
Initial effort  -0.319*** 0.074 -0.222*** 0.044   -0.228***  0.045
Minimal initial effort (D)  -0.550  0.349 -0.542*  0.319   -0.584*  0.343
Experienced  (D)  0.104 0.327 -0.106 0.302    0.021 0.289
Belief  (D)  -0.045 0.407 0.065 0.396    0.068 0.399
High  productivity  (D)  -0.876 0.661 -0.634 0.548    -0.646 0.556
Zurich  (D)  0.951 0.598 0.611 0.461    0.617 0.469
Constant  0.768  0.522 0.852* 0.482    0.879* 0.498
N  220   220     220  
Log-likelihood  -418.1   -411.6     -411.3  
p  >  F  0.000  0.000     0.000  
r
2  0.419  0.453     0.454  
Notes. OLS regression of the effort revision Δei dependent on the difference in the initial efforts (Effort 
difference ej - ei). Model 2 allows for different slopes in the positive and negative domain by including the effort 
difference in the positive range, i.e., max[ej - ei,0] and a dummy for positive effort differences. In Model 3 we 
add interaction variables between Experienced and the measures for effort differences. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses, two agents in a group are clustered; * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
However, as Figure 2 suggests, there are substantial differences between positive and 
negative effort differentials. In Model 2 we allow for different slopes by adding two 
additional variables for the initial effort differential. The variable Initial effort difference if > 0 
is calculated as max[ej - ei, 0]. 
The results of Model 2 confirm the impression from Figure 2. The coefficient of Initial 
effort difference is highly significant and positive. Agents who learn that their co-agent had 
chosen a lower effort reduce their effort on average by .38 effort units per unit of the 
differential. The interaction variable Initial effort difference if > 0 has a significant negative 
coefficient, indicating that the reaction to the effort differential is lower in the positive 
                                                 
14 Interestingly, this result is similar to the magnitude of peer effects found in field studies. For their respective 
measures of peer effects Ichino and Maggi (2000) find values between 0.14 and 0.18; the Falk and Ichino (2006) 
estimates result in 0.14, Mas and Moretti (2009) report 0.17, and Bandiera, et al. (2010) report 0.13. 
  13domain. The net effect in the domain of positive effort differentials is the sum of the first and 
second coefficient. The effect is still positive (.04, the sum of the first two coefficients) but 
not significantly different from zero (p = .436, F-test). Thus, the interaction between the two 
efforts is mainly driven by effort reductions of the high-effort agents. This stands in contrast 
to the field (experimental) results reported by Falk and Ichino (2006) and Mas and Moretti 
(2009) who find the opposite, namely that mutual observability increases the productivity of 
the low effort agents.
15 The dummy for positive effort differences is insignificant, which 
means that the reaction to the effort difference does not shift discontinuously at zero.  
Among the remaining variables only Initial effort has a significant impact on the effort 
revision. Unlike in the estimates shown in Table 3 the coefficient is negative. Thus, the higher 
the initial effort the larger is the downward revision.  
Model 3 allows for the possibility that agents who are experienced with the gift-exchange 
game (because they played a related game prior to this one – see Section II.B) react 
differently to effort information than inexperienced agents. The interaction variables are 
insignificant. Thus, the observed peer effects are robust to experience. 
We summarize our findings in Result 2. 
Result 2: Overall, effort revisions and differences in initial efforts are positively 
correlated. Agents who learn that their co-agent has provided less effort than 
them, reduce their effort significantly, whereas agents who chose a lower initial 
effort than their co-agent increase their effort only insignificantly. 
D. Discussion 
Results 1 and 2 establish that voluntary cooperation is subject to peer effects, and that peer 
effects take the form of positively correlated efforts (with a kink at the co-agents’ effort). 
These results raise the question what the implications are for standard theories of social 
preferences.  
Before we continue to investigate this question, we briefly argue why learning about the 
money-maximizing solution cannot account for our results. The fact that people tend to revise 
their efforts downwards might be seen as evidence for the relevance of learning. A closer look 
at our data reveals, however, that the downward revision is unlikely due to erroneously high 
initial efforts. First, we show in Model 3 of Table 4 that experienced subjects do not show 
weaker reactions to effort information (in fact, they seem to react even stronger). Second, 
recall that subjects had access to a ‘What-if Calculator’ when taking their decision (see Figure 
1). Our software recorded subjects’ calculations. All but 11 of our 489 subjects calculated the 
payoffs for the Nash equilibrium efforts and therefore should not be surprised by the fact that 
                                                 
15 We can only speculate about the reasons for this result. One explanation is that our experiment is conducted in 
full anonymity whereas in these studies agents could observe each other, which might have exerted some social 
pressure on low-performing agents. An additional possible explanation is that our effort choice is an abstract 
decision, whereas in these studies effort is linked to a real task. The ‘social facilitation’ paradigm in social 
psychology (Zajonc (1965)) suggests that the mere presence of another person can improve performance. See 
also Falk and Ichino (2006), p. 48, for a discussion. 
  14a co-agent with a lower effort earns a higher payoff. Thus, Results 1 and 2 are most likely not 
due to learning money maximization. 
Are the peer effects, therefore, a new behavioral phenomenon that cannot be explained by 
existing theories of social preferences? At first glance, one might have this impression. Recall 
that our one-shot design ensures that subjects have no reason other than their social 
preferences when choosing their initial effort and that there are no earnings interdependencies 
between agents. So why would an inconsequential piece of information by another player 
induce a change of mind? Before we resort to other behavioral explanations we first explore 
what existing theories of social preferences have to say on this question, given that they can 
all explain initial effort choices.  
 
IV. What Standard Models of Social Preferences Predict about Peer Effects  
in the Trilateral Gift Exchange Game 
We focus our analysis on the subgame starting when the two agents choose their effort. 
We derive agent i’s reaction function to agent j’s effort decision, that is, ei = R(ej) and focus 
on the derivative with respect to ej. A particular model predicts a peer effect if dei/dej ≠ 0; no 
peer effect is predicted if dei/dej = 0. Because (i) role allocation was random, (ii) we explained 
the game to the subjects as a three-player game and made them aware of the earnings 
consequences of each other’s choices (see instructions and Figure 1), and (iii) subjects were 
not informed about any decision other three-player groups took, we assume that a group of 
three players forms the reference group. 
In the following we derive the basic results and briefly discuss the underlying intuitions. 
For all details see Appendix C and for general reviews of models of social preferences see 
Sobel (2005) and Fehr and Schmidt (2006). Readers not interested in the details can directly 
refer to the summary Table 5 at the end of this section.  
 
1. Distributional preferences. We consider models of altruism and inequity aversion. 
Players have a utility function ui(xi, xj, xP) which contains as arguments the monetary earnings 
xi, xj and xP of the two agents i and j and the principal P, respectively. The models differ in the 
assumptions about the derivatives of ui with respect to other players’ earnings. Models of 
altruism like Charness and Rabin (2002) or Cox, Friedman and Sadiraj (2008) assume that 
these derivatives are positive. Models of inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt (1999); Bolton 
and Ockenfels (2000)) assume that these derivatives are positive as long as other players are 
poorer than player i but turn negative otherwise. We now discuss these models in turn.  
Models of altruism. Assume agent i maximizes a utility function ui(xi, xj, xP) subject to the 
constraints given by equations (1) and (2) (Section II.A). The other agent's payoff xj is 
independent of i's actions. Agent i chooses ei to set xi and xP at the level which maximizes her 
utility given xj. The left panel in Figure 3 illustrates the utility maximization problem of agent 
i in the (xi, xP) space. The lower thick line represents the choice set for agent i in the example 
case where agent j chooses ej = 5. If agent i chooses maximum effort the principal's earnings 
are highest and i's earnings are lowest. The slope of the graph representing the choice set is  
  15–v/7, the marginal benefit of effort divided by the marginal cost of effort. The thin lines show 
two indifference curves of agent i. The slope of the indifference curves indicates the marginal 
rate of substitution between agent i's earnings and the principal's earnings. If agent i cares 
sufficiently for the earnings of the principal (as reflected in agent i’s indifference curves) then 
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FIGURE 3: PEER EFFECTS IN A MODEL OF ALTRUISM. Left panel: Utility maximization in the (xp, xi) 
space for an altruistic agent i. Thick lines represent two choice sets for two levels of the other agent's 
effort; u
1 and u
2 indicate indifference curves of an altruistic agent i; ei* denotes the optimal effort of 
agent i in case agent j chooses an effort of 5 and the lower thick line is i’s choice set. Right panel: 
Corresponding reaction function of agent i to agent j’s effort. 
How does an altruistic agent react to changes in ej? An increase in the other agent's effort, 
for instance, shifts the choice set in Figure 3 upwards because it increases the principal's 
income. The location of the new optimum depends on the 'income elasticity' of the demand 
for xi, the own income. If the own income is a ‘normal good’, the new optimum will lie 
northeast of the old optimum as depicted in the left panel of Figure 3. In this case agent i 
reduces his effort whenever agent j increases his effort. In the following we will primarily 
focus on agent i’s reaction function to j’s effort. The right panel of Figure 3 depicts the 
corresponding reaction function. If xi is a normal good for agent i, then the slope of the 
reaction function will be negative for interior solutions, that is, the two efforts are strategic 
substitutes (dei/dej < 0).
16  
For expositional purposes we derive the reaction functions using a parameterized version 
proposed by Cox, et al. (2007).
17 They use a CES utility function 
  ( ) (, , ) / ijP i j j P P ux x x x x x
ααα θ θ =+ + α
                                                
, (3) 
 
16 Assuming that xi is a normal good is certainly reasonable for most people and situations. Otherwise, a subject 
facing a windfall gain should be ready to transfer more than the gain to another subject. In a trust game, for 
instance, a subject should return more money than received by the trustor. a behavior which is hardly ever 
observed.  
17 The model builds on Cox and Sadiraj (2010) who introduced (in the working paper version of 2003) the CES 
function as shown in equation (3) and call their approach a model of egocentric other-regarding preferences, or 
egocentric altruism. For an application to voluntary cooperation in public goods games see also Cox and Sadiraj 
(2007). For a nonparametric version see Cox, et al. (2008). 
  16which allows varying the elasticity of substitution between an agent's own payoff and the 
other players' payoffs by  (, 0 ) ( 0 , 1 ] α ∈− ∞ ∪ ; θj and θP measure the emotional state of player i 
towards the other two players. Suppose for a moment that θj and θP are positive. For α = 1 the 
payoffs are perfect substitutes and agent i chooses either maximal effort (for θP >  7/v) or 
minimal effort (otherwise), irrespective of ej. In this case the slope of the reaction function is 
zero and there is no interior solution. Panel A of Figure 4 shows these reaction functions as 
horizontal lines at the bottom and the top of i's action space. Another extreme case is when the 
payoffs are perfect complements and weighted equally (Leontief case α = –∞ and θP = 1). In 
this case agent i chooses ei to ensure xi = xP (if feasible). The reaction function can be derived 
by solving this equation for ei which gives us a linear function with a slope of –v/(v + 7).  
xi = xP
 Leontief 






1 5 10 15 20
A. Cox-Friedman-Gjerstad
xi = xP




















1 5 10 15 20
C. Bolton-Ockenfels
xi = xP



























FIGURE 4: ILLUSTRATIONS OF PEER EFFECTS (REACTION FUNCTIONS ei = R(ej)) PREDICTED BY THEORIES OF 
DISTRIBUTIONAL PREFERENCES. Note. The reaction functions are drawn for w = 200 and v = 35. 
 
Between these extremes is a continuum of negatively-sloped reaction functions. The lines 
in Figure 4A show some examples. All reaction functions are linear functions that intersect at 
a point far to the upper left of the admissible effort space. Both the slope and the intercept of 
the reaction function are jointly determined by α and θP. Optimal efforts of agent i might lead 
to situations where the principal earns more than agent i, which is the case above the thick 
line in Figure 4A. In all cases the slope lies in (–1,0) for interior solutions. 
  17Another model of altruism is Charness and Rabin (2002) who - in the basic version - 
propose a utility function that captures preferences for efficiency (utilitarian) and/or care for 
the least fortunate (maximin). Utility is case-wise linear in all arguments:  
  () { } () ( ) (, , ) 1 m i n , , 1 ijP i ijP i j P u xxx x xxx x x x λλ δ δ ⎡ ⎤ =− + +− ++ ⎣ ⎦ , (4) 
with λ weighing the importance of distributional preferences ( [0,1] λ∈ ) and δ measuring the 
type of distributional preferences, ranging from δ = 0 for pure efficiency concerns to δ = 1 for 
pure maximin concerns. Unlike the Cox, et al. (2007) model, Charness and Rabin do not 
predict a continuum but only four distinct kinds of reaction functions: For a low enough λ an 
agent will always choose minimal effort. For high λ and low δ an agent seeks to maximize 
joint income and chooses maximum effort (thereby minimizing her own income). This 
reaction function is labeled as 'Utilitarian' in Figure 4B. The most interesting cases are in 
between. If the maximin motive dominates (high δ), agent i increases her effort if and only if 
she can increase the minimal earnings in the group.  
In Figure 4A we already introduced the locus where agent i earns the same as the 
principal (xi = xP) as a downward-sloping linear function. In panel B we add two loci: a 
steeper downward-sloping function indicating where agent j earns the same as the principal 
(xj = xP) and the 45-degree line indicating where the two agents earn the same. The 
intersection of the three lines is the situation in which all three earnings are equal, which is the 
case when both agents choose ē = (3w + 7)/(2v + 7). 
In case of ej < ē a maximin agent chooses her effort along xi = xp, to prevent the principal 
from being the uniquely poorest. In case of ej > ē agent i is always richer than agent j. Agent i 
cannot influence xj; however, i’s choice determines whether agent j or the principal is poorest. 
Agent i then chooses her effort such that the principal does not earn less than agent j, that is, 
the reaction function follows xj = xp. Finally, for intermediate values of δ there is a type with a 
v-shaped best reply. She promotes efficiency under the restriction that her own earnings do 
not become the unique minimum. For ej < ē this agent acts as a maximin type; for ej > ē he or 
she matches agent j’s effort and, hence, the reaction function follows the 45-degree line.  
Models of inequity aversion. Theories of inequity aversion assume that agents dislike 
unequal payoff distributions, ceteris paribus. Consider the model of inequity aversion 
proposed by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). Utility is u(xi, σi) where σi is i’s share of total 
earnings. For a given xi players are assumed to prefer their share to be equal to one third. 
Deviations from equality reduce utility.
18 To get an intuition consider first the case of a very 
strongly inequity averse player, who only cares about her payoff share. In the role of agent i, 
this player chooses her effort such that her share of total earnings equals one third:  
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18 An early model of inequity aversion is Bolton (1991). This model, however, cannot explain non-minimal 
efforts in our game, because players are assumed to care only for inequality if other players earn more than them. 
  18For such a player the two efforts are strategic substitutes. To see this, consider an increase 
of player j’s effort. This decreases xj and increases xP. Since providing more effort is efficient 
the sum of xj and xP increases by v – 7 > 0 and the left-hand expression in (5) drops below 1/3. 
To re-establish equality agent i must decrease her effort in order to increase xi. The reaction 
function of such an agent is depicted in Figure 4C, labeled as 'Exclusively equity-oriented'. 
Using the payoff functions (1) and (2) and solving (5) for ei one can show that the slope of the 
reaction function is (7 – v)/(14 + v) < 0 (note that this is not the same reaction function as the 
limit case in panel A where xi = xp). Players with weaker inequity aversion face a tradeoff 
between the benefit of their own payoff and the discomfort of earning a relative income above 
one third. Lower concerns for inequity aversion lead to lower efforts, ceteris paribus.  
The thin lines in Figure 4C show five examples of reaction functions. There is a lower 
limit of inequity aversion under which behavior is identical to money-maximization. 
However, it generally holds that, for interior solutions (1 < ei < 20), the slope of the reaction 
function is always in (–1, 0), that is, the two efforts are always strategic substitutes.  
The intuition is that an inequity-averse agent providing low effort suffers from earning 
more than her equal share. To relieve this adverse feeling there are two possibilities: (i) she 
increases her own effort and thereby lowers her earnings, or (ii) the co-agent increases his 
effort and thereby increases the total payoff, which in turn brings the (unchanged) income of 
the agent at hand closer to the equal share. 
The model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) is also built on the notion of inequity aversion. 
However, unlike in the model by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) players make bilateral 
comparisons with all group members. Players get utility from their own monetary payoff and 
disutility from any payoff difference with comparison partners (see also Loewenstein, 
Thompson and Bazerman (1989)). The utility function in the Fehr-Schmidt model is  
  () ( ( ) [] [] [] []
22
ij i P i i j i P ux x x x x x x x x x )
α β + ++ =− − + − − − + −
+ , (6) 
where [a]
+ ≡ max(a,0). The disutility of earning less than another group member is linear and 
equal to α times the payoff difference. Earning more than another group member also leads to 
a disutility, weighted by β (but β < α). We illustrate the reaction functions of Fehr-Schmidt 
agents in Figure 4D. Two loci are important: the negatively-sloped line where agent i earns 
the same as the principal and the 45-degree line where the two agents earn the same. In the 
intersection of the two lines all three players earn the same, which is the case at e = ē.  
The Fehr-Schmidt model predicts three types: A player with low concern for 
advantageous inequality (β < β' = 14/(v + 14) ≈ 0.29 for v = 35) will always choose minimal 
effort. For higher β there are two possibilities depending on the relative importance of α and 
β: If a player is relatively intolerant towards disadvantageous inequality compared to his 
intolerance of advantageous inequality, we call him ‘Behindness averse’ (BA; 
β' < β < (14 + 7α)/(v + 7)). Such a player will choose non-minimal efforts under the condition 
that he does not fall behind another player. For low co-agent's efforts (ej < ē) the best reply is 
ei = ej up to ē. For high co-agent's efforts (ej ≥ ē) he chooses the effort that equalizes his 
earnings to the principal's earnings. A third type called ‘Aheadness averse’ (AA; 
  19β' < β > (14 + 7α)/(v + 7)) is an agent i who (i) suffers heavily from the fact that the principal 
earns less than him (high β), and (ii) is relatively tolerant to the fact that he earns less than 
agent j (low α). Such an agent always seeks to match his payoff with the principal's payoff. 
The resulting reaction function is identical to the Leontief case shown in panel A of Figure 4.  
Inequity aversion and altruism. Kohler (2011) proposes a model that expands the Fehr-
Schmidt utility function by adding a term γ(xj + xP), very similar to the utilitarian part of the 
model by Charness and Rabin (2002). Consequently, for low γ the model predicts reaction 
functions of the Fehr-Schmidt types; for high γ the model predicts the utilitarian and 
intermediate type from Charness and Rabin (2002).  
 
2. Models of reciprocity. Theories of reciprocity model the idea that people reward kind 
acts with kindness and mean acts with unkindness (Rabin (1993)). A theory of reciprocity that 
is adequate for our sequential gift-exchange game is the sequential reciprocity model by 
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004). This theory does not predict peer effects because agent 
j’s effort has no influence on agent i’s earnings. Thus agent j is neither kind nor unkind to 
agent i. Hence, dei/dej = 0. The only reason for choosing a non-minimal effort is to reward the 
principal for a high wage, irrespective of the other agent’s actions.  
In case of type-based reciprocity (Levine (1998)) the results are similar. In this model 
players gain (dis)utility from other agents’ income if they are altruistic (spiteful) types. 
However, since the agents cannot influence their co-agent’s income they cannot act 
altruistically (or spitefully) towards them and thus, do not take their actions into account. 
Hence, no peer effects are predicted: dei/dej = 0.  
 
3. Hybrid models. Cox, et al. (2007) and Charness and Rabin (2002) enrich their models of 
altruism with reciprocity. In both cases reciprocity does, however, not change the qualitative 
predictions about the shape of the reaction functions discussed so far. Reciprocity means that 
if the agent is treated unkindly he weighs the earnings of the unkind player less or even 
negatively in his utility function. In both models intentions play a role only with respect to the 
wage offer. Low wage offers are perceived as unkind, high wages as kind. In case of Cox, et 
al. (2007) a low wage leads to a negative θP. A player with θP < 0 chooses minimal effort 
irrespective of ej, thus acting like a money-maximizing agent. Also in Charness and Rabin 
(2002) there is a reciprocity part by which payoff-based concerns are reduced when a player is 
treated unkindly by another player. Negative emotions towards the principal shift the reaction 
functions downwards but do not qualitatively change the characteristics derived above. 
Finally, the model of Falk and Fischbacher (2006) combines interpersonal payoff 
comparisons with intentionality. Like in Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), reciprocity 
does not predict a direct link between the two efforts. However, agent i wants to reciprocate to 
the principal and cares about earnings differences. The predictions of the Falk-Fischbacher 
model are very similar to the predictions of the AA-type in the Fehr-Schmidt model. For very 
strong reciprocal preferences the reaction function is again identical to the AA-type, weaker 
reciprocal preferences result in a parallel downward shift. 
 
  204. Summary. Table 5 summarizes the models and their predicted peer effects (the predicted 
slope of the reaction function(s)). The rightmost column of Table 5 provides numerical 
boundaries for the slope of the reaction function(s) of the respective model.  
 
TABLE 5: SUMMARY OF THEORETICAL PREDICTIONS WITH REGARD TO dei/dej 

































Cox, et al. (2007)  (. 6 3 ,. 9 8 ) − −  
Charness and Rabin (2002)  
 -  Maximin  .83 1.2 − ∪−  
 -  Intermediate  .83 1 − ∪  
  - Utilitarian  0 (no interior solutions) 
Inequity  
aversion 
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)  ( .57, .70) − −  
Fehr and Schmidt (1999)  
  - Aheadness averse (AA)  .83 −  
  - Behindness averse (BA)  .83 1 − ∪  
Both  Kohler (2011) Either AA, BA, Intermediate, or Utilitarian 
(Type based) 
Reciprocity 
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) 0 
Levine (1998) 0 
Hybrid 
models 
Cox, et al. (2007)  no additional slopes to altruism prediction 
Charness and Rabin (2002)  no additional slopes to altruism prediction 
Falk and Fischbacher (2006)  .83 −  
Notes. Predictions for the slope of agent i’s reaction function to agent j’s effort, ei = R(ej). For the piecewise 
linear models (Charness and Rabin, Fehr and Schmidt) we can calculate the slopes directly from the formula 
setting v=35. For models predicting a continuum of reaction functions we derive the range of possible slopes. 
For Cox et al. (2007) we report the range of slopes of best replies that lead to interior solutions. In case of Bolton 
and Ockenfels (2000) there is no closed-form solution for the best replies. The numbers reported stem from 
numerical calculations using parameterized utility function u = xi – b(σi – 1/n)
2. Details are in Appendix C. 
With two exceptions all models of social preferences incorporating various psychological 
motives predict either that there are no peer effects (efforts are unrelated) or that peer effects 
take the form of efforts being strategic substitutes. The intuition for the latter is simple: with 
distributional preferences agents are ready to choose non-minimal efforts either because they 
(i) enjoy the principal’s earnings (altruism), or (ii) they seek equitable outcomes (inequity 
aversion). A co-agent who puts in high effort reduces i’s need to put in high effort as well. In 
none of the models agent i cares about whether the increase in the principal’s earnings is 
caused by his or her own or some other player’s actions. There are two notable exceptions 
that allow for strategic complementarity between the two efforts, the Fehr-Schmidt BA-type, 
and the Charness-Rabin intermediate type. Interestingly, in both cases efforts have to be one-
to-one complements, that is, the two agents choose identical efforts. 
Our theoretical analysis of the three-person gift-exchange game shows that the most 
robust (concurrent) qualitative prediction about peer effects is that the agents’ efforts are 
negatively related, that is, efforts are strategic substitutes (see Table 5). By contrast, Figure 2 
suggests that efforts are strategic complements. This observation of positively correlated 
efforts is not yet conclusive, however, because the theoretical predictions concern the slope of 
reaction functions. In the following we report experiments that provide qualitative 
conclusions about the sign of peer effects.  
  21V. Results II: Can Standard Models of Social Preferences Explain Peer Effects? 
In order to measure the slope of the reaction function we make use of agent i’s belief 
about agent j’s initial effort. In a subset of our data (n = 110) we elicited agents’ beliefs about 
their co-agent’s initial effort decision. Given the belief we can observe two points on an 
agent’s reaction function in case the belief was wrong. This provides a direct measure of the 
sign of the slope of a monotonic reaction function by estimating the function  ( ) ij ef ee j ′ Δ= − , 
where  j e′ denotes agent i’s belief about j’s initial effort. We call the difference between the 
true co-agent's effort and the belief ‘surprise’.  
We use OLS to estimate the average  ( ) ij j ee e α βε ′ Δ =+ − +. According to the theories 
discussed above, the difference between the belief and the actual effort of the co-agent is the 
only  reason to revise effort. Thus, all theories predict α = 0. The predicted slope of the 
reaction function depends on the productivity parameter v. However, we do not have to 
control for this because all our observations with the belief question stem from experiments 
with v = 35. As said, a robust prediction is that efforts are strategic substitutes and the slope of 
the reaction function is between -.98 and -.57 (see Table 5).  
In contrast, the estimation results show that the slope coefficient is positive and significant 
(β = .261, p = .003). The constant is insignificant (α = -.230, p = .216). Figure 5 shows a scatter 
plot of the relevant data and the OLS regression line. We allow for different slopes in the 
negative and positive domain. Again we observe a kink when we go from a negative to a 
positive surprise. The shaded area and the diagonal in Figure 5 show the range of slopes 
predicted by the various models of social preferences. Irrespective of whether we estimate the 
reaction as a whole or piecewise we can rule out a negative slope for the reaction function. 
Apart from the large number of observations in the origin (which are compatible with any 
slope of the reaction function) there are very few observations that are compatible with a 
negatively-sloped reaction function. A theory that can account for a positively-sloped reaction 
function is the Fehr-Schmidt model (see Table 5 and Figure 4D). A BA-type Fehr-Schmidt 
agent chooses to match the other agent’s effort up to a certain threshold. According to the 
parameter calibration suggested by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) we should observe only 10 
percent BA-type agents in the experiments with the high productivity parameter; the estimates 
provided by Blanco, Engelmann and Normann (2011) suggest 21 percent BA-type agents.  
Could it be that the BA-type agent is much more frequent among our subjects? We check 
this by a case-by-case evaluation of compatibility with the BA Fehr-Schmidt prediction. An 
observation is called BA-compatible if (i) the initial effort is chosen according to the best-
reply function given the belief about ej, and (ii) the revised effort is chosen according to the 
best-reply function given the observed ej.
19 Of the 220 observations in the EIT, 95 (43 
percent) are compatible with the BA-prediction. However, a lot of these observations are 
agents who choose the minimal effort and are therefore also compatible with the standard 
prediction. If we restrict our sample to agents with non-minimal initial efforts then only 16 
out of 96 (17 percent) choose their efforts in accordance with the BA type. Another way to 
                                                 
19 Condition (i) can only be checked in the subsample where we elicited beliefs. For the remaining observations 
we check whether the initial effort is within the range allowed be the reaction function as shown in Figure 4. 
  22assess the predictive power of the BA-prediction is to look at the fraction of effort revisions 
(Δei ≠ 0) that are explained by the BA-type behavior. Among the 73 agents who do revise their 
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FIGURE 5: EFFORT REVISIONS DEPENDENT ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN  
THE ACTUAL ej AND AGENT i’s BELIEF ej’.  
The shaded areas and the diagonal are predictions consistent with theories of social preferences. 
 
The second theory that predicted positively-sloped reaction functions is the intermediate 
type in the Charness and Rabin (2002) model. We also do a case-by-case check whether our 
observations are compatible with this prediction. Thirteen (6 percent) out of the 220 
observations in the EIT follow this pattern. Among the 73 agents who do revise their effort 
six (8 percent) do so as predicted by the intermediate type. Furthermore, although the slope 
estimates are clearly positive, they are nowhere near unity, as the two theoretical cases would 
predict. An F-test rejects the hypothesis β = 1 for both the linear and the piecewise linear 
estimate (p < .01).  
We summarize our findings in Result 3: 
Result 3: Peer effects in voluntary cooperation predominately take the form of 
efforts being strategic complements rather than substitutes as predicted by most 
theories of social preferences. 
The explanations offered by standard theories of social preferences do not capture the kind 
of peer effects we observe. One apparent possibility to account for our empirical results is to 
alter the definition of the reference group. Suppose that for some reason, agents only compare 
themselves, e.g., because agents feel more attached to the co-agent than to the principal. Yet, 
redefining the reference group to comprise the agents only does not offer a convincing 
explanation of our empirical findings. To see why, assume an agent with distributional 
preferences u(xi, xj). By design, agent i cannot influence xj. Therefore, even with altruistic 
preferences agent i will choose minimal effort irrespective of ej. A Fehr-Schmidt agent would 
  23as well always choose minimal effort, because adjusting to a higher co-agent's effort would 
require β > 1, which is ruled out by the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model. The only model that 
predicts strategic complementarity in this case is Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). In the extreme 
case of an exclusively equity-oriented agent the reaction function is the 45-degree line, i.e., an 
agent would want to match the other agent’s effort. But even in this situation it is unclear why 
the two such agents should coordinate on a situation with non-minimal effort, because they 
could increase utility by choosing minimal effort. 
 
VI. Discussion: What Explains Peer Effects in Voluntary Cooperation? 
We reported results from a three-person gift-exchange experiment designed to detect peer 
effects in voluntary cooperation in an environment where only non-selfish social preferences 
can explain voluntary cooperation. In a design that avoids the reflection problem we find that 
voluntary cooperation is shaped by peer effects and they take the form of efforts being 
strategic complements (with a kink at the co-agent’s effort). 
Our empirical results are opposite to the predictions of a host of standard theories of social 
preferences. We showed that with a couple of exceptions efforts are predicted to be either 
unrelated or strategic substitutes. Negatively-related efforts arise because agents also care 
about the principal; the behavior of the co-agent just changes the extent to which own effort 
needs to be adjusted to implement the desired payoff for the principal. Perfectly matched 
efforts can only arise if agents are strongly ‘behindness averse’ (in the Fehr-Schmidt model) 
or if agents’ preferences are intermediate between utilitarian and maximin (in the Charness-
Rabin model). However, even these models can only explain a minority of effort choices.
20  
If standard models of social preferences cannot explain the peer effects we see, the 
question arises whether motivations that are not captured by the standard models can explain 
our results. One possibility is that people are conformists - a tendency long established by 
social psychologists (Asch (1952)). Conformism is a psychological mechanism that “refers to 
the act of changing one’s behavior to match the responses of others” (Cialdini and Goldstein 
(2004), p. 606). Conformity is a potential channel because conformism is a very common and 
deeply rooted human predisposition (Henrich and Boyd (1998)) that can also explain 
important economic phenomena (see, e.g., Bernheim (1994);  Clark and Oswald (1998)) 
including ones related to our research question (Sliwka (2007)).  
Another possibility is that people follow a norm of reciprocity but take the behavior of 
others as a cue about what is an appropriate reciprocal response. Such norm-following 
(calibrating one’s own reciprocal response on that of others) is empirically plausible (Keizer, 
Lindenberg and Steg (2008);  Krupka and Weber (2010)) and can explain relevant 
experimental data (López-Pérez (2008)), including the type of peer effects we observe in our 
data (Gächter, et al. (2012)).  
                                                 
20 This is in line with the results of Kagel and Wolfe (2001) who investigate three-player ultimatum games and 
report poor predictive success for models of inequality aversion. 
  24Positively correlated efforts can also result if people are motivated by considerations of 
social esteem (Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008)) whereby effort choices are made to create 
favorable impressions in the other players. In the remainder of this paper we sketch three 
recent formal models that, respectively, incorporate conformity, norm-following, and social 
esteem as relevant motivations into their frameworks. All three models predict that peer 
effects take the form of positively correlated efforts (for details see Appendix C).  
Sliwka (2007) presents a model that allows for conformity. Selfish agents have a utility 
function  , while fair agents have distributional social preferences:  . 
Conformism is introduced by assuming a third type, a conformist agent, whose utility is either 
or  , depending on which type he thinks is more frequent in the population. All 
conformist agents have a prior about the distribution of types in the population. The revision 
stage in our experiment provides the agents with additional information about the distribution 
of types. An agent with non-minimal effort might thus conform to money-maximizing 
behavior if he is paired with an agent with minimal effort and vice versa.  
( ) Si ux ( , , ) FijP ux xx
S u F u
Agents might also derive utility for norm-following (or disutility from breaking them). 
López-Pérez (2008) provides a formalization of this possibility.
21 He starts with the simple 
idea that players share a common norm which guides behavior. The norm demands from an 
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where xi denotes the earnings, γ > 0 is a preference parameter and r denotes the number of 
players who did not (yet) break the norm. If the agent sticks to the norm then her utility is 
equal to her earnings. If the agent deviates and chooses  i ee < % then she enjoys higher earnings 
but suffers a psychological cost of γr, which can be interpreted as a feeling of guilt or shame. 
These costs do not depend on the size of the deviation, which implies that whenever an agent 
deviates she chooses ei = 1. Furthermore, breaking a norm is assumed to be less costly to the 
agent if others do so as well, that is, if r is low. 
To make this model specific, López-Pérez posits an efficiency and equity norm where a 
social welfare function is maximized which contains (i) the sum of all earnings and (ii) the 
difference between the best-off and worst-off player. For the three-person gift-exchange game 
the norm demands the principal to pay the highest wage and the two agents to choose either 
maximum effort ( ) or the effort which equalizes all earnings at the highest wage 
(
20 e = %
200 607/(2 7 v ) w ee= == + %
                                                
), depending on the relative weight of argument (i) and (ii).  
An agent’s effort depends on the strength of her preference parameter (γ) and on whether 
she observes the co-agent violating the norm. If γ is large (small), the agent always (never) 
follows the norm. There is an interesting intermediate range of γ where an agent starts by 
obeying the norm and thus chooses non-minimal effort, but revises to minimal effort if she 
learns that the co-agent did not follow the norm.  
 
21 See Krupka and Weber (2010) for a related approach. 
  25Considerations of social esteem can also explain positively correlated efforts. Ellingsen 
and Johannesson (2008) model players who care about what others think of them.
22 Their 
model is only defined for two players. We assume a utility function adapted for our three-
player gift-exchange game:  
 () ii i jP i j ji P ux xx P θ θσ θσ =+ + + + . (8) 
The first two terms concern the material outcomes of the game for which the model 
assumes altruistic preferences (θi ≥ 0, similar to the model of Cox, et al. (2007) for α = 1) and 
ij θ  measures agent j’s estimation about  i θ , interpreted as j’s esteem for i. Finally  j σ  
measures how important j’s opinion is for i, and it is assumed that  j σ  is increasing in  j θ , i.e., 
the higher the altruism of the other player the more his opinion matters to agent i. Taken 
together, the third term in (8) represents agent i’s pride from the interaction with the other 
agent and the fourth term is i’s pride from the interaction with the principal. 
The model turns the gift-exchange game into a signaling game. Ellingsen and Johannesson 
assume that there are two types of agents, altruists with θH and selfish players with θL 
(θH > θL). They show that in a separating equilibrium selfish agents choose minimal effort 
while altruistic agents signal their type to the principal by choosing a non-minimal effort   
(this assumption is consistent with our empirical evidence – see Table 1). In the three-player 
gift-exchange game agents not only signal their type to the principal but also to the other 
agent. When choosing the initial effort agents do not know the type of the other agent but 
have a prior probability p of expecting an altruistic type. In Appendix C9 we show that the 
effort necessary to signal altruistic preferences is increasing in p, that is, there is a function 
 with  . Intuitively, the more likely it is that i’s co-agent is altruistic the more pride 
agent i can gain by being regarded as an altruist, irrespective of whether he actually is an 
altruist or not. Thus, to credibly demonstrate his altruism, i must become more generous to the 
principal.
i e %
() i ep % 0 i e′ > %
23 In our three-player gift-exchange game selfish players always choose minimal 
effort. Altruistic agents initially choose  ( ) 1 ii ee p = > %
ˆ (0) ii ee
. In the revision stage agents learn the 
type of their co-agent and update their prior probability to either 0 or 1. When paired with a 
selfish player they lower their effort to  = % , else they increase their effort to ee. 
Thus, concerns for social esteem can explain positively correlated efforts, but cannot explain 
the kink in effort revisions observed in the experiment.  
ˆi = % (1) i
In summary, newer theories of social preferences that incorporate desires for conformity, 
norm-following, or social esteem, can rationalize the empirically observed positively 
correlated efforts. The kink in the reaction to observed effort differences shown in Figure 2 is 
best captured by the model of López-Pérez (2008). This is the only model that predicts a 
distinct asymmetric effect of the effort information in the three-person gift exchange game: 
                                                 
22 Closely related is the model by Bénabou and Tirole (2006), which assumes that players differ in two 
dimensions, their preference for (i) the social good and (ii) money. Players choose their actions to signal high 
interest in (i) and low interest in (ii). Andreoni and Bernheim (2009) present a model which formulates the 
players’ desire to be perceived as fair and apply it to dictator games. 
23 Here we assume that the players evaluate their esteem for other players by the final effort. Otherwise one 
could make the argument that the altruist’s initial effort already proves his altruism and he could maximize his 
material utility in the revision stage. 
  26some agents initially choose their effort according to a norm and turn to a selfish strategy 
once they observe others breaking the norm. If they find it optimal to break the norm in the 
first place then observing high co-agent’s efforts does not turn them into norm-abiding 
players. This suggest that peer effects as observed in our experiment are better explained by 
models of conformity, norm-guided behavior or considerations of social esteem than more 
direct motives such as altruism or inequity aversion. 
Against this argument one may object that these newer theories also allow for more 
motives than the standard theories of social preferences, and one standard theory, the Fehr-
Schmidt (1999) model (the BA-type, see Table 5), actually can, at least qualitatively, explain 
positively correlated efforts without resorting to additional motives. Put differently, Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999) might provide a parsimonious explanation of peer effects in voluntary 
cooperation, if we are prepared to relax the prediction that agents choose the same efforts to 
positively correlated efforts. Whether this is a valid argument is a task for future research and 
Gächter, et al. (2012) provide a first step in this direction. They build on the theoretical results 
of this paper (that Fehr-Schmidt preferences can, at least qualitatively, explain peer effects) 
and also provide evidence that the measured descriptive norms are as well consistent with the 
peer effects we see. Interestingly, a comparison between norms explanations and Fehr-
Schmidt preferences for peer effects suggests a surprisingly strong explanatory power of the 
latter, despite unambiguous evidence that descriptive norms exhibit peer effects.   
 
  27Appendix (For Online Publication) 
Christian Thöni and Simon Gächter:  
Social Preferences and Peer Effects in Voluntary Cooperation 
 
Appendix A: Experimental instructions 
Appendix B: Data overview 
Appendix C: Theoretical details 
 
Appendix A: Instructions 
[In the following we will present the information subjects received during the experiment. Editorial comments like this one 
are added in brackets. In the majority of sessions subjects first played a three person one-shot gift-exchange game, but they 
did not receive any feedback about other subjects' decisions. In the sessions identified as Experienced subjects previously 
played a repeated three person gift-exchange game for eight periods in a stranger matching protocol. In this experiment they 
learned the prices paid by the principal, but not the choice of the co-agent. The game was presented in a buyer seller framing. 
Principals are buyers who offer a price. Sellers choose quality. The instructions and control questions to this first experiment 
can be found in the online supplement of Gächter and Thöni (2010). In the following we show the information subjects 
received at the beginning of the second experiment, which is the experiment we report in this paper.] 
 
Instructions for the Second Experiment 
Before we will inform you about the decisions of the other two members of your group we would like to conduct a second 
experiment. In this second experiment you will again receive an endowment of 400 points. Your points will again be 
converted at the rate of: 
1 Point = 3 Rappen. 
The points you will earn in this experiment will be paid out to you together with your earnings from the first experiment at 
the end of the experiment. 
 
The Second Experiment in Detail 
The second experiment is very similar to the first experiment. Again one buyer and two sellers constitute a group. The 
assignment of the participants to the groups is done at random. Like in the first experiment the buyer has to choose the prices 
for his two sellers and the sellers choose their quality. Again this experiment will be conducted only once. 
However, there are three important differences relative to the first experiment: 
•  In this second experiment the buyers have to choose the same price for both buyers. 
•  The feasible prices are now 50, 100 and 200. 
•  The income of the buyers is calculated differently in the second experiment. Unlike in the first experiment, the sum 
of the qualities in the buyers’ income is multiplied by 35 instead of 18. The income of the buyers is therefore 
calculated as: 
Income Buyer = 35 * (Quality1 + Quality2) – Price1 – Price2 
 
The calculation of the sellers’ incomes remains unchanged, i.e., the calculation is the same as in the first experiment:  
Income Seller = Own Price1 – 7 * (Own Quality – 1) 
When deciding, you will again have access to the ‘What-if-calculator’ where you can check out the calculation of the 
incomes. 
 
Do you have any questions? 
 
 
[End of the printed instructions. While the buyers choose their prices the sellers see a screen containing the following 
information:] 
 
Unlike in the first experiment you will be informed about the price you receive from your buyer when deciding about your 
quality in this second experiment. You then can choose your quality as a number between 1 and 20. Since the buyer has to 
pay the same price to both of his sellers the other seller in your group will receive the same price as you. In this moment your 
buyer is choosing the price. When the price is chosen you will be informed about it and you can choose your quality. 
Please press “continue” when you have finished reading this information. 
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[After that, the sellers see the following decision screen. The lower part of the right panel was only included in the sessions 





[When all qualities are chosen, the sellers receive a second information screen. The shaded sentence only appears in the EIT. 
Everything else is equal.] 
 
Possible revision of your quality choice 
You have just chosen your quality. In the next step you can possibly revise your quality choice, if you wish to do so.  
You will thereby be informed about the quality that the other seller in your group has chosen. 
In the next screen you have to re-enter your quality choice. You have two possibilities: You can either leave your quality 
unchanged or you can change your quality. In any case you have to make an entry, even if you do not want to change your 
quality. In this case you can simply enter the same number as in the last screen. If you want to change your quality then enter 
your new quality. 
Both sellers in your group will again enter a quality. However, only one of the two sellers in your group can actually 
change the quality. This means that either your reentered quality or the reentered quality of the other seller will be used for 
the calculation of the earnings. The computer will randomly choose one of the two sellers. For the other seller the quality 
choice of the last screen remains unchanged. 
In case the computer chooses you, your income will be calculated with your reentered quality. On the other hand, if the 
computer chooses the other seller, then your quality choice from the last screen remains unchanged und will be used for the 
calculation of your income. 
Please contact us if something is unclear. If not, please press the “continue” button to proceed to the next screen where you 
can choose your quality again. 
 
[The sellers are then shown the revision screen (see Figure 1 in the main text). In the main treatment (with wage 
transparency) this screen contains information about the other worker’s effort decision. Note that this is the first time the 
subjects learn something about the other worker’s decision. When all subjects have re-entered their quality a screen with the 
results of the game appears. The subjects learn the definitive qualities of the other seller and themselves and their resulting 
income. After that, we provide the payoff information of the first experiment.] 
 
  29Appendix B: Data Overview 
 
TABLE B1: SUMMARY OF THE OBSERVATIONS BY TREATMENT VARIATION AND CONTEXTUAL PARAMETERS. 
   Contextual variation  Total 
v  18 35  35  35   
Belief no  no  yes  Yes   
Experience no  no  no  Yes   
Main treatment: EIT 45  120  93  72  330 
Control treatment: NIT 15  72  36  36  159 
Total 60  192  129  108  489 
Numbers indicate subjects as agents and principals. The number of agent observations is two thirds of the numbers shown. 
 
Appendix C: Theoretical Details 
This appendix derives the reaction functions predicted by the various models of social 
preferences. We focus on the subgame starting after the principal has chosen the wage where 
both agents simultaneously choose their effort. For simplicity, we treat effort as a continuous 
variable in [1,20]. We use the payoff functions xi(w, ei), and xP(w, ei, ej) as defined by 
equations (1) and (2) in the main text. By xik we denote the first derivative of xi() with respect 
to the k
th argument. In the following we frequently need the derivatives of xi and xP with 
respect to ei, which are xi2 = –7 and xP2 = v. Often models of social preferences predict that 
agent i chooses his effort such that his earnings match those of another player. We define a 
function  ei = Ri=P(ej) as the reaction function that matches agent i’s and the principal’s 
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. (9) 
A second important reaction function matches agent i and agent j’s earnings. This is 
simply 
  () ii j j eRe e = j = = . (10) 
Finally, in one model agent i seeks to equalize agent j’s  payoff and the principal’s 
















These three reaction functions are depicted in panel A of Figure C1. In the intersection all 
three earnings are equalized. This happens, when both agents choose the effort 
ē = (3w + 7)/(2v + 7).  
                                                 
24 The notation []
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C. Types in Fehr-Schmidt
 
FIGURE C1: ILLUSTRATION OF IMPORTANT PARAMETER REGIONS IN THE DIFFERENT MODELS. Panel A: Regions in 
the action space of the two agents. Panel B: Parameter map and predicted types of the Charness-Rabin model. 
Panel C: Parameter map and predicted types for the Fehr-Schmidt model. All graphs drawn for w = 200 and 
v = 35. 
 
 
C1. Cox, Friedman and Gjerstad (2007) 
Using the CES utility function from equation (3) in the main text we can derive a closed-form 
solution for the reaction function. The derivative of the utility function with respect to ei gives 
the first order condition for interior solutions 
  [] () ()
1 1













Because the earnings of agent j does not depend on i’s choices, θj drops out. Both 
expressions in the squared brackets are positive. Thus, in case of neutral or negative emotions 
towards the principal (  the derivative in  0 P θ ≤ (12) is negative and there is no interior 
solution. Agent i will then always choose minimal effort. In case of positive emotions interior 
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for interior solutions. If α →− ∞ then  1 τ →  and the reaction function converges to Ri=P. In 
Panel A of Figure 4 in the main text we show the reaction functions for τ = .382, .442, .52, 
.62, .77, 1.35, 2.05, and 4.2. 
 
 
  31C2. Charness and Rabin (2002) 
The derivative of equation (4) in the main text with respect to ei is 
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(15) 
where the parameter r indicates the marginal effect of a change in ei on the minimum income 
in the group. There are three cases, depending on whether agent i,  j, or the principal is 
poorest. Agent i’s effort has no marginal effect on the first-order condition but in influences r 
through the distribution of earnings. Whether the expression in (15) is positive or negative 
depends on the preference parameters λ, δ, and on r. We can calculate thresholds for the 










> . (16) 
Note that the expression is monotonically decreasing in r. There are four different reaction 
functions depending on the number of inequalities that are satisfied given the three different 
values of r.
25  
(i) If the inequality is never satisfied, then the agent will choose minimal effort.  
(ii) If only the ‘weakest’ inequality with r = v is satisfied then agent i is ready to choose a 
non-minimal effort whenever the principal’s income is minimal. We call this type a 
‘Maximin’ agent (M). The reaction function for such a type is the upper boundary of the area 
A and F in the left panel of Figure C1. 
(iii) If the inequality is also satisfied for r = 0 then the agent wants to increase his effort 
whenever one of the other player’s income is minimal. This is the case in the areas A, B, C, 
and F in Figure C1. The reaction function is the upper boundary of this area. We call this type 
“Intermediate” (I). 
(iv) If the preference parameters are such that all three inequalities are satisfied then we 
call the agent “Utilitarian”. Such an agent chooses maximum effort irrespective of what the 
other players do. To conclude, the reaction functions R
CR predicted by Charness and Rabin are 
either minimum or maximum effort or one of the following two: 
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25 For notational convenience we assume that the preference parameters δ and λ are drawn from a continuous 
density function and rule out cases where the parameters equal any of the critical values. We thereby get rid of 
the (not very interesting but notationally tedious) cases where the players are exactly indifferent between several 
effort levels within a range. 
  32Panel B of Figure C1 shows the parameter constellations that give rise to the four types. In 
the Appendix of their paper Charness and Rabin enrich the model with reciprocity (discussed 
in the main text under ‘Hybrid models’). They introduce ‘demerit’ parameters, in our case 
, indicating (inversely) how much the other player deserves to be treated nicely. 
The utility function is 
,[ 0 , jP dd∈ 1 ]
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with the nonnegative parameters b and k for the weight of the demerit parameter in the 
Rawlsian and the utilitarian part of the utility function. The parameter f > 0 allows to account 
for destructive behavior. Note that in case there are no hard feelings with respect to the other 
players ( ) the utility function is identical to equation  , jP dd= (4). The derivative with 
respect to ei is 
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 (19) 
The implications of the additional parameters for the reaction function are quite 
straightforward: For positive demerits the parameters k and f determine (in combination with λ 
and δ) which one of the four reaction functions is chosen. The parameter b influences the 
position of the reaction function. In general, a higher b shifts the reaction functions R
CR,M and 
R
CR,I downwards. If we assume dj = 0 (which is plausible since no information about j’s 
actions are available) then a higher b shifts the two reaction functions downwards leaving the 
kink on the 45-degree line. For very high b the reaction function R
CR,I is identical to the 45-
degree line. However, none of the parameters has a marginal influence on the slope of the 
reaction function.  
 
C3. Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) 
Agents maximize a “motivation function” u(xi, σi), where σi(w, ei, ej) = xi(w, ei) / X(ei, ej) is 
player i’s share of the total earnings, with X(ei, ej) = xi + xj + xP.
26 Regarding the derivatives 
with respect to the first and second argument the Bolton-Ockenfels model assumes u1 ≥ 0, 
u11 ≤ 0, u2 = 0 for σi = 1/n, and u22 < 0. As a result, the motivation function is strictly concave in 
the income share, and, for a given income xi, it is maximized when i earns exactly the equal 
share, i.e., σi = 1/n. Agent i’s first-order condition for interior solutions is: 
 
26 The Bolton-Ockenfels model requires nonnegative incomes. In order to avoid negative outcomes we calculate 
all incomes including the endowment of 400 ECU. Overall losses are not possible in this case. 










To derive the slope of the reaction function we calculate the total differential of equation 
(20): 
  () () []
22
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From the monetary payoff functions we know that xi2 = -7,  X1 = X2 = (v - 7) > 0, and all 
higher-order derivatives of the monetary payoff functions are zero. Furthermore, interior 
solutions are only possible when agent i earns at least the equal share, which implies u2 < 0 
(this ensures that the second-order condition is negative). The derivatives of the relative 
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Hence, we can derive the slope of the reaction function: 
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Furthermore, the expressions in (22) show that the effects of ei on i’s income share are 
stronger than the effects of ej, i.e., |σi2| > |σi3| and σi22 > σi23. Thus, we can conclude that the 
slope of the reaction function must lie between 0 and –1 for interior solutions: 
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For the extreme case of a perfectly inequity-averse Bolton-Ockenfels agent we can derive 
a closed form of the reaction function R
BO. This agent would choose an effort such that, 
whenever possible, his earnings share equals exactly one third, i.e., σi(w, ei, ej) = 1/3. Solving 
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. (25) 
This is the reaction function labeled 'Exclusively equity-oriented' in Figure 4C in the main 
text. For deriving the other reaction functions in this figure we used u(.) = xi – b(σi – 1/n)
2 (as 
suggested by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), p. 173) with b = 12000, 5000, 3000, 2000, 1000. 
  34C4. Fehr-Schmidt (1999) 
The first-order derivative of the utility function shown in equation (6) in the main text is  
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Like in Charness and Rabin (2002) ei does not have a marginal impact on the derivatives 
but affects the case differentiation. Starting with case (i) where agent i earns the highest 
income (area A and B in the left panel of Figure C1), the derivative is positive if 
14/( 14) β >+ v . An agent with a lower β  will always choose minimal effort. An agent with a 
sufficiently high β  will increase his effort until his income equals one of the other two 
players’ earnings.
27  
In case (ii) agent i earns more than the principal but less than the co-agent (area F). Here 
we have to distinguish two cases. If the preference parameters satisfy (7 ) 1 4 7 β α +> + v  then 
agent i is called Aheadness averse (AA). Such an agent increases his effort to adjust his payoff 
to the principal’s earnings. In the opposite case agent i is called Behindness averse (BA), and 
he decreases his effort to adjust his earnings to the other agent’s earnings.  
In cases (iii) and (iv) (area C, D, and E) the derivatives (equation (26)) are unambiguously 
negative due to the parameter restriction α β ≥  in the Fehr-Schmidt model.
28  
In summary, the reaction functions R
FS of the two Fehr-Schmidt types with interior 
solutions are 
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. (27) 
Thus, the slope of the reaction function for interior solutions is either 1 or  , 
which is in (-1,0). Panel C in Figure C1 shows the α-β combinations that correspond to a 
particular type. The shaded area is excluded by the parameter restrictions. 
() /7 vv −+
 
C5. Kohler (2011) 
This model is very similar to Fehr and Schmidt (1999). The only difference is that the first 
derivative in equation (26) contains an additional term vγ, accounting for the agent’s marginal 
utility from the increase in the principal’s income relative to the Fehr-Schmidt case. Setting 
                                                 
27 Like in the case of the Charness and Rabin model we ignore the cases where parameters α and β are equal to 
any of the critical values. 
28 The results by Blanco, et al. (2011) suggest that this restriction might not be supported by the data. Our 
conclusion with regard to predicted types does, however, not crucially hinge on this assumption. As long as we 
assume that β < 1 no other types are predicted. In fact, we would need β > 2 to predict an additional type. This 
type would be identical to the intermediate type predicted by the model of Charness and Rabin (2002). 
  35the derivatives in (i) to (iv) (with the term vγ) to zero allows us to derive the critical parameter 
constellations giving rise to the five possible types. If 0 7 0.5 7 vv γ ββ >++ −  then the agent 
will always provide minimum effort. If the expression is positive then the agent is ready to 
provide non-minimal effort; his type depends on the size of α relative to β and γ. If 
(2 ) /7 2 v α αγ β β ′ >= + + −  then the agent is a BA-type. If α α′ <  but 
(2 7 14)/( v 7) v α αγ β ′′ >= +− +  then the agent is an AA-type. Unlike in the Fehr-Schmidt 
model also the derivatives in (iii) and (iv) can be positive, giving rise to two additional cases. 
If  α α′′ < all of the above conditions are met but if  2( 7)/(14 v ) v α αγ ′′′ >= − +  then the 
agent’s reaction function is identical to 
, CR I R . Otherwise, ifα α′′′ < , then the agent always 
provides maximum effort. 
 
C6. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) 
This model measures the intentions of other players by whether their actions allow an agent to 
earn a high income within the possible range of earnings. The authors define an equitable 
income as the mean between the minimum and maximum attainable income (which might 
depend on beliefs about others’ actions). If the actions of another player allow i to earn a 
payoff above (below) average, then his action is considered kind (unkind). In the three-player 
gift-exchange game the earnings of agent i are independent of agent j’s action. Thus, there 
cannot be a direct effect of ej on ei.  
However, one could suspect an indirect effect due to the fact that a reciprocal agent wants 
to treat the principal nicely. This is also not the case. If agent i is treated kindly by the 
principal, then he seeks to return the favor and allow the principal to earn a high income 
relative to the equitable income. Both the minimum and maximum attainable xP depend on ej. 
Thus, changes in ej do only result in a parallel shift of the ‘feasible set’ of the principal’s 
earnings, leaving the trade-off between the money maximizing and reciprocating towards the 
principal unchanged for agent i. 
If we would incorporate the idea that agent i considers the total earnings of the principal in 
a way that he feels a stronger urge to reciprocate when the principal is poor then we could 
produce negatively sloped reaction function similar to the reaction functions derived for the 
models of distributional preferences. 
 
C7. Levine (1998) 
Levine’s starts with distributional preferences similar to Cox et al. (2007) but with an 
important additional feature: the weight another player has in i’s utility depends on i’s 












j , (28) 
with −1 < ai < 1 denoting agent i’s type and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 reflecting the weight of the estimate about 
the other’s type (aP, aj) in i’s altruism. A player’s type is drawn from a common cumulative 
  36distribution F(ai). For λ = 0 this model is equivalent to Cox et al. (2007) with α = 1. In case of 
λ > 0 players use observed behavior to update their estimate about aP and aj. Taking the 














which is independent of ei. Agent i will either provide full or minimal effort, dependent on 
his own altruism parameter (ai) and on his estimate about the principal’s preferences (aP). 
However, the optimization of agent i is independent of what agent j does. 
 
C8. Falk and Fischbacher (2006) 
The utility function proposed by Falk and Fischbacher has the following (simplified) form:  
  iii j j
j
uxρ ϑσ =+ Δ ∑ , (30) 
where  i x  is the monetary outcome and 0 i ρ >  is a preference parameter measuring the 
importance of reciprocal motives. For every player j the reciprocal motivation is captured by 
the following terms:  j ϑ  is the intention factor, which is unity if player j acted intentionally 
and 0 ≤ εi ≤ 1 otherwise.
29 The outcome term  j Δ  measures the kindness of j towards i and the 
reciprocation term  i σ  measures the kindness of i’s reaction. In the context of the three-person 
gift-exchange game the utility function for agent i is: 
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The first term is agent i’s monetary payoff. The second term is the reciprocity term 
towards the principal. The outcome term (first bracket) depends on agent i’s belief about the 
principal’s belief about the two efforts. The first expression in brackets shows the agent’s 
belief about the principal’s kindness. This expression depends on the agent’s beliefs about the 
principal’s beliefs about the two efforts. These second-order beliefs are denoted as   and  i e′′ j e′′. 
If this term is positive, agent i perceives the principal’s actions as kind. The second 
expression in brackets shows the reciprocal reaction, that is, the influence of agent i’s effort 
on the principal’s payoff (given agent i’s belief about the other agent’s effort  ). The third 
term shows the reciprocity towards the other agent. Since the agents cannot influence each 
others’ payoffs the third term is independent of ei and therefore irrelevant for agent i’s 
optimization. If we differentiate the utility function 
j e′
(31) with respect to ei we can write the 
first order condition as: 
  {} 77 ( 1 ) ( ) 2
i
iP i i j
i
u
we v e e w v
e
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. (32) 
 
29 The parameter εi is a second preference parameter that measures a player’s pure concern for an equitable 
outcome. Thereby, εi = 1 means that intentions do not matter while εi = 0 describes the case where the other 
agent’s income is only taken into account if his actions are intentional. 
  37In equilibrium, beliefs must be consistent, that is,  iii eee ′ ′′ = =  and  j j eee ′ == j ′ ′ . From the 
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Thus, the Falk-Fischbacher model predicts a reaction function that is linear in the other 
agent’s effort with a slope of  ( ) 1/ / 7 ij ee v v −< ∂ ∂ = − + <
i
0 . For interior solutions the slope is 
independent of the preference parameter ρ  and the intention factor  F ϑ . The intention factor 
is equal to one if the principal pays a wage of 100 or 200. This is an intentionally kind act, 
since it could have made the agent worse off by paying a wage of 50. Being paid a wage of 
50, on the other hand, is perceived as non-intentional and therefore we set  P i ϑ ε = . The 
preference parameter  i ρ  has a very straightforward influence on the reaction function: no 
concern for reciprocity   leads to minimal effort, a higher concern for reciprocity 
shifts the reaction function upwards. The limit case 
() 0 → i ρ
( ) i ρ →∞  is identical to Ri=P(ej). 
 
C9. López-Pérez (2008) 
This model formalizes norm abiding preferences. The underlying idea is simple: there is a 
behavioral norm which norm abiding people like to follow, called the E-norm (E stands for 
both efficiency and equity). This norm is determined by the so-called fairmax distribution of 
the monetary payoffs, which is the result of the maximization of the total earnings minus the 
difference between the most and the least well-off player: 
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ij
ijP i j P i j P
eew
Fxxx x x x x x x δ =++− − ,   (34) 
where 1 > δ > 0 measures the importance of the concern for inequality relative to efficiency. If 
δ is small then efficiency dominates and both efforts need to be maximal to maximize the sum 
of the earnings. In addition, wages must be maximal to minimize the income differences. If δ 
is close to one then the inequality part dominates and the unique solution of the maximization 
problem is that the principal pays the highest wage and the agents choose their efforts to 
equalize all three earnings,  200 607/(2 7) w e = v = + . Starting from a situation with maximal 
efforts the inequality is most efficiently reduced when both efforts are lowered by the same 
amount. The critical δ is where the marginal benefit (in terms of F) equals the marginal cost. 
The marginal benefit of increasing both efforts is 2(v − 7), the marginal cost, if efforts go 
beyond the point where earnings are equalized, is δ(2v − (−7)), which leads to δ = 8/11. 
Ignoring the case where δ equals the critical values we have a unique E-norm in this game, 
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  38Whether a player sticks to the norm or not depends on a preference parameter γ > 0 and the 
observed behavior of other players. For simplicity we assume homogeneous players. Denote 
by r the number of players who follow the norm or have made no choice so far. An agent's 















The number r is updated during the game and γr measures the non-pecuniary cost of norm 
deviation, which is increasing in the number of norm followers in the group. From the utility 
function it is clear that an agent does only have to consider two actions: if the cost of 
deviating from the norm are sufficiently high the agent chooses  i ee = % , else he deviates from 
the norm and chooses   to maximize his earnings. Apart from the preference parameter γ 
two factors influence the decision. When the game starts we have r = 3, because no player has 
taken an action so far. If an agent observes that the principal does not pay the highest wage 
and/or the other agent does not follow the norm then r is reduced by one or two units.  
1 i e =
Let k be the monetary cost of following the norm, which is the cost of the effort provided. 
Depending on δ, we have  200 () w kc e = =  or  (20) kc = . An agent's reaction function is 
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 (37) 
An agent with 3γ > k will initially choose  i ee i = %  if the principal pays the high wage 
(otherwise the condition is 2γ > k). If, in the revision stage, the agent learns that the co-agent 
did not follow the norm (ej = 1), then the agent will revise the own effort to ei = 1 if γ satisfies 
3γ > k > 2γ (or 2γ > k > γ in case of w < 200). Otherwise he will stick to the norm. 
 
C10. Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) 
Ellingson and Johannesson (2008, p. 1003) describe a separating equilibrium for the two-
person gift-exchange game. We adapt their model to our case and focus only on the agent’s 
problem. There are two types of players, altruistic (θH) and selfish (θL) players, with 
0 LH v 7 / θ θ ≤<< . The upper bound on altruism ensures that no agent wants to choose non-
minimal effort in the absence of pride concerns. Dependent on the type of the other player 
there are two levels of salience of the other player’s esteem, σH und σL, with σH > σL. We only 
look at cases where the principal paid the highest wage and has a high salience for the two 
agents. There is a common prior 0 < p < 1 that denotes the probability of an agent being 
altruistic. We define  ( , ) ( ) ii j i i j P vee x x x θ ≡+ +  as the material part of agent i’s utility. The 
incentive compatibility constraint for a selfish agent is then 
  () ( ) (1, ) (1 ) ( , ) (1 ) ij H H L L i i j H H L ve p p v e e p p H σ σσ θ σ σσ ++ + − = ++ + − % θ . (38) 
The left-hand expression is i’s utility if he chooses minimal effort and gets low esteem 
from both other players. Esteem from the principal is weighed by σH; for the other agent’s 
  39type is not known it is the expected weight. The right-hand side is i’s utility of choosing a 
non-minimal effort  , assuming this leads to high esteem. This effort is:   i e %
  () ( ) (1 )
() 1
7














In a separating equilibrium the altruistic agent chooses a non-minimal effort of  i ee = %
1 =
 to 
credibly signal his altruism to the other two players; the selfish agent chooses  . What 
changes in the revision stage when the agents choose the revised effort  ? When the co-
agent’s effort is disclosed the agent knows whether the co-agent is altruistic or selfish. This 
changes the effort which credibly signals altruism. We can calculate the effort by setting 
either  p = 0 or p = 1. Because the expression in 
i e
ˆi e
(39) is increasing in p we have 
. Thus, a selfish agent will always choose minimal effort. An altruistic 
agent will initially choose   and revise upwards to 
(1) ( ) (0) ii i ee p e >> %% %
( ) ii ee p = % ˆ (1) ii ee = %  if the co-agent chose 
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